Industrial Organization Theory
- The goal of the course is to prepare students for managerial, analytical, entrepreneurial, and research activities and duties in the course of employment at entry level and junior executive positions and continuation of their education in postgraduate programs.
- Capable to conduct research activities, including market competition analysis; Capable to work in a team.
- Understand relevant economic theory (concepts and models), capable solve problems on this topic.
- Capable to work in a team. Capable to conduct research activities, including market barriers estimation.
- Market Power and Market Structure1.1. Introduction to IO: The NEIO and SCP. Review of microeconomic knowledge about markets and firm behavior. 1.2. Market Power. 1.3. Concentration Measure. 1.4. Market Definition. 1.5. Analytical project. Part 1.
- Monopoly and Price Discrimination2.1. Review of Monopoly. 2.2. Durable Goods Monopoly. 2.3. Price Discrimination. 2.4. A Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe.
- Oligopoly3.1. Static Oligopoly Models. 3.2. Dynamic oligopoly. 3.3. Collusion.
- Market Entry4.1. Entry Barriers. 4.2. Entry Deterrence. Introduction to Entry Games. 4.2.1. Analytical project. Part 2.
- Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints5.1. Incentives for Vertical Merger. 5.2. Vertical Restraints.
- HomeworkHomework (rating grade). Three themes of the course end with a student group project (3-4 students), which includes written part, oral presentation, and individual questions. For this assignment, students receive clear instructions and the list of requirements.
- Classroom Test
- Seminar work
- Self-study work
- Interim assessment (2 module)0.2 * Classroom Test + 0.3 * Exam + 0.2 * Homework + 0.15 * Self-study work + 0.15 * Seminar work
- Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=nlebk&AN=11386
- Bresnahan, T. F., & Reiss, P. C. (1991). Entry and competition in concentrated markets. Journal of Political Economy, 99(5), 977. https://doi.org/10.1086/261786
- Liran Einav, & Jonathan D. Levin. (2010). Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report. NBER Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.nbr.nberwo.15786
- Michael D. Whinston. (2001). Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know. Journal of Economic Perspectives, (2), 63. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.15.2.63
- Reiss, P. C., & Wolak, F. A. (2007). Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization. Handbook of Econometrics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.h.eee.ecochp.6a.64
- Richard J. Gilbert, & Michael L. Katz. (2001). An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.CFE766C3