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  • Jürgen Eichberger, the honorary professor of the University of Heidelberg (Germany) with scientific seminars "Games in context".

Jürgen Eichberger, the honorary professor of the University of Heidelberg (Germany) with scientific seminars "Games in context".

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Seminars will be held by  Jürgen Eichberger, Honorary Professor of the University of Heidelberg (Germany), Leading Researcher of the School of Economics and Finance, HSE Perm.

We invite you to take part in the scientific seminars "Games in Context". Seminars will be held by Jürgen Eichberger, Honorary Professor of the University of Heidelberg (Germany), Leading Researcher of the School of Economics and Finance, HSE Perm.   

The series of seminars will be interesting to graduate students, researchers and university professors, bachelor and master students.

Jürgen Thomas Hermann Eichberger,
Leading Research Fellow

The series of seminars includes an introduction to the topic of solutions in uncertainty with the disclosure of the concepts of capacity, the Choquet integral and other applications to game theory (seminars on March 22 and March 29), moving on to the main article "Games in Context: Equilibrium under Ambiguity for Belief Functions" ( April 12).

Annotation:

The main talk will focus on strategic games in which the expectations of the players depend on the informational context. For such games, a new approach to defining equilibrium is proposed – context-dependent equilibrium in uncertainty. Participants in the game are supposed to form expectations about the behavior of other players, and these expectations can be represented as a belief function. This allows exogenous contextual information, in the spirit of Schelling (1960), to be combined with endogenous beliefs about counterparty behavior, similar to the standard Nash equilibrium.

For any strategic game, the existence of a context-dependent equilibrium in uncertainty is proved – for any contextual information and any degree of its plausibility. The proposed concept of equilibrium is illustrated for different types of information in games. This explains some of the results of experiments with games involving coordination of participants. The article was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behavior magazine.

When and where?

Date: 22 March, 29 March and 12 April 2021

Time: 3 p.m. - 4 p.m. (Yekaterinburg timeGMT+5)

Format / Platform: online, a link to the ZOOM conference will be sent after the registration.

Seminar language: English.

Registration is required to participate.

 

Registration

Tatiana V. Bukina

Associate Professor, School of Economics and Finance