Credit elasticities in less-developed economies: Implications for microfinance.

Karlan, D. S., & Zinman, J. *The American Economic Review*, 2008.

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Structure



- The Market Setting
- Experiment
- Model
- Elasticities of Demand
- Conclusion

The Market Setting

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- South Africa
- "Cash loan" industry

• Risky sector

Lender

High 30% 1 month

7,75%-11,75% 1,4,6,12 month **Low** 3% 12+ month

The Market Setting



Incentives to repay

Carrots

- ↓ future price
- •↑ future loan size

Sticks

- Reports to credit bureaus
- •Collection agents' calls
- •Court summons
- •Wage garnishment

No interest rate ceiling (fall 2003).

Experiment



- 53'810 past clients
- Rates $\epsilon[3,25\%; 14,75\%]$
- 96% < standart rate
- 1% > standart rate

TABLE 2—EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION REGRESSIONS

Estimator: Dependent variable:	OLS Interest rate (00s of basis points)	Probit 1 = Borrowed after deadline, and not before deadline	Probit 1 = Rejected	
Mean (dependent variable):	8.03 (1)	0.15	0.14 (3)	
Monthly interest in percentage points (e.g., 8.2)	50,000,000	-0.0001 (0.0007)	0.002 (0.002)	
Number of months since last loan with lender	(0.001)			
Number of prior loans with lender, log	0.00 (0.01)			
Female	(0.02)			
Number of dependents	(0.00)			
Married	(0.02)			
Age, log	-0.00 (0.05)			
Rural	(0.02)			
More educated	-0.01 (0.02)			
External credit bureau score, log	(0.01)			
Record exists in external credit bureau	(0.10)			
Internal credit score, log	-0.06 (0.13)			
(Pseudo-) R-squared Sample:	0.11 All with nonmissing	0.05 All	0.05 Applicants	
Number of observations	53,554	53,810	4,540	

The offer and loan application process

6)

Direct mail solicitations with randomly different offer interest rates sent out to former clients.

Clients
"take up" by
going to
branch and
applying for
loan.

Client is offered a loan at the randomly assigned offer rate r^o (regardless of whether she brings in letter).

Loan officer makes credit and loan supply decisions based on "standard" interest rates, hence "blind" to experimental rates; 86 percent of applications were approved.

Loan contract finalized. All approved clients ended up borrowing.

Client given short survey and then picks up cash. Repayment behavior observed.

FIGURE 2. OPERATIONAL STEPS OF EXPERIMENT

the trusted way to borrow cash

30 October 2003

Shop 8 12 Market Street Krugoredorp 1739 Tel: 011 990 2944

BYTCHCTL STORY MEN THE THIRD THIRD

A low rate for you.

Congratulations! As a valued client, you are now eligible for a low interest rate on your next cash loan from This is a limited time offer, so please come in by 30 November 2003 to take advantage of this offer.

You can use this cash to pay for school, or for anything else you want.

 Enjoy fow monthly repayments with this offer! Here is one example of a loan you can get under this offer:

Interest	Loan	Loan	Monthly	
Rate	Amount	Term		
10.50%	R2000.00	4 Months	Repayment R710.00	

Loans available in other amounts. There are no hidden costs. What you see is what you pay.

If you borrow elsewhere you will pay R360.00 more in total on a R2000.00, 4 month loan.

How to apply:

Bring your ID book and latest paysip to your usual branch, by 30 November 2003 and ask for Mrs. Veno Naidoo.

Mrs. Veno Naidoo

Area Manager

P.S. Entoturating, it you have arrestly baset a loan stock the obtained what was stouch, you do not soutly for this of Comparison based on a compation's interest risk of 15% per mooth.



Model



$$y_i = f(C_i, X_i),$$

where:

- i potential borrowers;
- *yi- measure of take-up or* loan size demand for debt
- Ci a vector of loan contract terms (offer rate (ri) and/or the maturity (mi));
- Xi includes the two variables: pre-approved credit risk (low/medium/high), and the mailer wave (July, September, or October).

$$a_i = \alpha + \beta r_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_{ib}.$$

where:

- a= 1 if the client applied for a loan;
- ß unbiased estimate of the price sensitivity of loan take-up

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TABLE 3—THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN: PRICE SENSITIVITIES OF LOAN TAKE-UP

Dependent 1 = Applied variable:			1 = (Take-up with outside lender, not with our Lender)			1 = (Take-up with Lender after deadline, not before deadline)			
Mean (dependent variable)		0.08	0.07	0.22	0.22	0.28	0.15	0.15	0.18
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Interest rate in pp terms (e.g., 8.2)	-0.00289*** (0.00047)		-0.01723*** (0.00160)	0.00106 (0.00083)		-0.00958 (0.00660)	0.00042 (0.00064)		-0.01239** (0.00622)
1 = (rate > standard for client's risk		-0.02996*** (0.00398)			0.00539 (0.00512			-0.03630** (0.00869)	**
category) Pseudo <i>R</i> -squared	0.045	0.044	0.055	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.048	0.049	0.056
Sample:	Offer4 ≤ standard	Full	Offer4 > standard	Offer4 ≤ standard	Full	Offer4 > standard	Offer4 ≤ standard	Full	Offer4 > standard
Number of observations	53,178	53,810	632	53,178	53,810	632	53,178	53,810	632

Notes: Each column presents marginal effects from a single probit of a measure of loan take-up on the interest rate offered to the client, and risk category and mailer wave (not shown in table). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses and are clustered within branch. Interest rate coefficients show the change in the proportion taking up from a 100-basis-point increase in the monthly interest rate.




FIGURE 3. REGRESSION-ADJUSTED DEMAND CURVE FOR TAKE-UP WITH RESPECT TO PRICE

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TABLE 4—PRICE SENSITIVITIES OF LOAN SIZE

Estimator:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Tobit	OLS	OLS	Tobit
Dependent variable:			Loan Size			I	.og(Loan Siz	ze)
Mean (dependent variable):	106	104	1,428	1,428	1,428			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Interest rate in pp terms (e.g., 8.2)	-4.368***	-4.394***	-25.876**	-33.715***	-32.812***			
	(1.093)	(1.146)	(12.994)	(11.392)	(11.366)			
Log (interest rate)						-0.113**	-0.143***	-0.141***
						(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.041)
(Pseudo) R-squared Additional controls for	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.29	0.02	0.06	0.34	0.15
demos and credit risk?	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Branch fixed effects?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Conditional on borrowing?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	31,231	28,197	2,325	2,304	2,304	2,325	2,304	2,304

Notes: Loan size in rand; 7 rand ≅ US\$1 at the time of the experiment. Robust standard errors clustered on branch in all but tobit specifications. All specifications include controls for risk category and mailer. Additional controls added to unconditional specifications include: quadratics in internal credit score, external credit score, and gross income at time of pre-approval (but not net income at time of pre-approval, since this is available only for wave 3 individuals), months since last loan with Lender, number of prior loans with Lender, gender, number of dependents, marital status, quadratic in age, rural residence, education, and province. Controls for conditional specifications use income measured at the time of loan approval, and include net income at the time of loan approval as well. Sample size falls for loan size demand models, relative to take-up models (Table 3), because with loan size we include only applicants who were not randomly assigned a surprise rate reduction upon applying for a loan—see footnote 17 for details.






FIGURE 4. REGRESSION-ADJUSTED DEMAND CURVE FOR LOAN SIZE, CONDITIONAL ON BORROWING, WITH RESPECT TO PRICE

Pricing Strategy for Profitability and Access

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TABLE 5—GROSS REVENUE AND REPAYMENT SENSITIVITIES TO INTEREST RATES

Estimator: Dependent variable:	OLS Gross interest revenue (1)	OLS Average past due (2)	Tobit Average past due (2)
Interest rate in pp terms (e.g., 8.2)	2.553***	12.161***	18.064***
	(0.438)	(3.523)	(5.934)
Additional controls?	No	No	No
Conditional on borrowing	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.02	0.05	0.01
Number of observations	31,231	2,325	2,325

Notes: All dependent variables in rand; 7 rand \cong US\$1 at the time of the experiment. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses and clustered within branch for OLS specifications. Average past due over the first 7–12 months of the loan (this is all the we observe, hence the motivation for tobit). Controls included for risk category and wave of experiment.

Pricing Strategy for Profitability and Access






FIGURE 5. REGRESSION-ADJUSTED DEMAND CURVE FOR REVENUE WITH RESPECT TO PRICE

Maturity Elasticities of Demand



$$m_i = \alpha + \beta S_i + \chi R_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_{ib}$$

where:

- m the maturity chosen (parameterized linearly)
- S the maturity suggestion
- R vector of the randomly assigned offer and contract interest rates
- X- vector of risk and loan size presented in the offer letter's example loan

Maturity Elasticities of Demand

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TABLE 8B—MATURITY ELASTICITIES OF LOAN DEMAND: OLS AND IV ESTIMATES

	OLS			IV			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Maturity (linear)	0.161***	0.168***	0.155***	0.157**	0.214***	0.050	
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.126)	
Interest rate	-0.035	-0.053**	0.011	-0.036	-0.041	0.011	
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.038)	
Log (loan amount shown)	0.443***	0.390***	0.369***	0.445***	0.356***	0.408***	
	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.113)	
Income split?	No	Low income	High income	No	Low income	High income	
R-squared	0.52	0.59	0.45	0.52	0.56	0.32	
Number of observations	493	239	254	493	239	254	

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on branch. Log (loan size) is the dependent variable; results are similar for level loan size. IV specifications use the categorical measures of suggested maturity as the instrument; results are similar if we use the linear instrument

Conclusion



- Downward-sloping but relatively flat demand;
- Lender, which had no social targeting objectives, had no incentive to cut rates;
- Maturity elasticities are significant only among relatively low-income borrowers;
- Female and low-income borrowers are more sensitive to interest rates;
- The methodology can be adapted to other MFIs marketing approaches and strategic considerations.